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  The paper seeks to reformulate the ‘colourful and fluid’ early debate on the 
effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) in two ways.  Firstly, the wide range of 
separate  specific  concerns  of  the  early  debate  are  subsumed  within  four  generic 
issues, (i) efficiency, (ii) distribution, (iii) sovereignty, (iv) growth and development.  
Secondly, the analysis is now structured around modes of analysis of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs), as the agents that carry out FDI.  MNEs are seen as using the 
freedoms  of  international  transfers  central  to  globalisation  in  order  to  leverage 
competitively  the  differences  of  national  (or  other  coherently-defined)  economic 
units.  Crucially this response to difference is analysed as reflecting three potential 
MNE strategic motivations, (i) market seeking, (ii) efficiency seeking, (iii) knowledge 
seeking.  The core of the paper investigates how adoption of different motivations by 
MNEs  would  affect  performance  in  terms  of  the  different  generic  issues.    The 
synergies  of  this  mode  of  analysis  with  trade  policy  (the  implicit,  or  often  very 
explicit, move to outward-oriented industrialisation in the era of globalisation) and 
new growth theory are also discussed. 
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  The  early  debate  on  the  role  of  foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  in  less 
developed countries (LDCs) has been neatly characterised as ‘colourful and fluid’ 
(Balasubramanyam, 1985, p. 159).  One reason for the colourfulness of this debate 
was its emergence within the very politically-charged birth of development economics 
per  se  and  related  attempts  to  co-opt  it  into  disparate  wider  political-economic 
postures.  This points forward to our, hopefully calmer, concern here with the parallel 
need to evaluate multinational enterprises (MNEs) as participants in the processes of 
globalisation.  Another factor in leaving the early debates open and fluid was the lack 
of  a  commonly  agreed  methodology  for  analysing,  in  a  convincing  manner,  an 
observable mode of international transaction (FDI) with an obvious potential for a 
wide-ranging diversity of often intangible or unmeasurable implications.  This meant 
that much early analysis of the developmental effects of FDI fractured around detailed 
investigation of specific aspects of a wide range of separate areas of concern (e.g. 
extent and appropriateness of technology transfer;  job generation and employment 
conditions;  the allegation of decapitalisation;  balance of payments and trade effects;  
bargaining  mechanisms;    spillovers;  industry  structure  and  so  on).
1    As 
Balasubramanyam (1985, p.173) indicates, the emergence of separate analysis of the 
MNE (as the principal source of FDI), and its immediate association with market 
imperfections,  further  undermined  attempts  (e.g.  MacDougall,  1960)  to  formalise 
evaluation of FDI around the constructs of orthodox trade theory and, in particular, 
perfect competition.   3 
  If early theorising of the MNE helped to explain the indecisiveness of attempts 
to evaluate the implications of FDI then the subsequent analysis of these firms, now 
most usefully positioned at the interface of business strategy and economics, provides 
methodologies that are highly attuned to elucidation of issues of globalisation and 
development.  Central to this analysis, and to the lines of argument developed here, is 
a preference for organising an understanding of diversity, rather than simplifying it or 
assuming it away.  Two vectors of diversity define the structure of our subsequent 
analysis. 
  Firstly, the aims of an evaluation of MNEs in a globalised economy are seen 
as still having logical origins in the diversity of concerns addressed in early analysis 
of FDI.  However, to organise these into a more functional structure, we suggest that 
these variegated concerns can be subsumed into an  evaluation framework of four 
distinct generic issues (Dunning and Pearce, 1994).  Within globalisation the opening 
of national economies, with an increasing freedom of trade, has been interpreted as 
allowing MNEs to improve the ways in which productive resources are used, so that 
efficiency becomes an element of the framework through which we evaluate their 
performance.  By contrast the ‘flexibility and adaptability’ (Balasubramanyam, 1985, 
p.  160)  provided  to  MNEs  by  globalisation  may  limit  their  need  for  positive 
embeddedness  in  the  growth  and  development  processes  of  individual  national 
economies.  This provides another concern of the evaluation framework.  However, 
an important insight of analysis of the growth of MNEs was that organising globally 
through  ‘an  internal  bureaucracy  of  the  enterprise  transcending  the  market’ 
(Balasubramanyam, 1985, p. 161) gave them powers ‘in areas of pricing of products 
and  technologies’,  and  in  bargaining  more  generally,  that  raised  issues  of  the 
distribution  ‘of  gains  between  MNEs  and  host  countries.’    Furthermore,  these   4 
characteristics  of  MNEs  give  them  control  over  dispersed  elements  of  a  global 
strategy that can be ‘seen to pose a threat to the economic sovereignty of new nation 
states in the Third World’ (Balasubramanyam, 1985, p. 161). 
  The core of this paper, therefore, seeks to evaluate the implications of MNEs 
in terms of the four broadly-defined issues of efficiency, distribution, sovereignty, and 
growth and development.  To do this it is useful to characterise the strategic posture of 
the  contemporary  MNE  as  one  of  seeking  to  use  the  increasing  freedoms  of 
international transfers, reflecting the essence of economic globalisation, to leverage 
the differences between economic areas.  Such areas may, in practice, be national 
economies (especially where policy factors are influential), regions defined by the 
capacity to support cost-effective production,
2 or the type of technology- and skill-
based agglomerative ‘clusters’ that build around creative interdependencies and tacit-
knowledge  spillovers  (Porter,  1998,  chapter  7;    Birkinshaw  and  Hood,  2000;  
Cantwell and Iammarino, 1998;  Balasubramanyam and Balasubramanyam, 2000). 
  To operationalise this view of the MNE as responding to such international 
differences it is useful to see its overall global strategy as encompassing a number of 
analytically separable motivations or priorities.
3  Thus this framework here discerns 
three strategic aims.
4  Firstly, market seeking (MS), in which an MNE invests in a 
particular economy in order to supply its established products to the market of that 
country.    Secondly,  efficiency  seeking  (ES),  where  the  MNE’s  operations  in  a 
particular location are expected to supply certain parts of the product range to the 
company’s  international  markets  in  a  highly  cost-competitive  manner.    Finally, 
knowledge  seeking  (KS),  which  involves  the  internationalisation  of  the  MNE’s 
learning,  technology-generation  and  creative  processes.    The  two  aspects  of  KS 
invoked in the subsequent discussion here are product development through product    5 
mandate  (PM)  subsidiaries,
5  and  decentralisation  of  R&D  operations  (including 
precompetitive  basic/applied  research).
6    The  exposition  also  makes  use  of  the 
ownership  advantage  (OA)  and  location  advantage  (LA)  elements  of  Dunning’s 





  Here  we  address  the  purely  economic  concern  with  the  effectiveness 
(allocative  and  productive  efficiency)  of  the  use  of  the  world’s  fixed  stock  of 
resources  and  capabilities.    Essentially  we  idealise  the  question  as  ‘under  what 
conditions do the operation of MNEs in a host country contribute to raising world 
economic welfare to a level that could not have been achieved in any other way?’ 
  We can perhaps initiate discussion rhetorically, with the suggestion that the 
sustained  growth,  in  recent  decades,  of  the  numbers  of  internationally-competing 
firms, alongside the persistent deepening of the global scope of most existing MNEs, 
must surely be strongly indicative of such efficiency growth.  Immediately, however, 
a  full  acknowledgement  of  the  strategic  heterogeneity  of  MNEs  questions  the 
inevitability  of  such  a  prescription.    Two  aspects  of  the  strategic  concerns  or 
behaviour of MNEs can support such doubts. 
  Firstly, the presence of MS motivation certainly need not support, and often 
actively compromises, productive efficiency.  Two historical contexts can now be 
seen as having generated MS behaviour in MNEs.  During the interwar years the 
economic disruption of the early 1920s, and the later period of sustained economic 
depression,  generated  high  levels  of  protectionism  in  most  leading  industrial 
economies.    This  forced  many  firms  with  a  strong  established  commitment  to 
international markets to considerably extend the number of countries in which they   6 
located  supply  facilities,  with  such  production  subsidiaries  now  predominantly 
constrained to provide only for the host-national market.  This mode of international 
supply can be seen to remain dominant in the first two decades after 2nd World War, 
as trade protection remained in place but the individual national economies grew at 
healthier rates in response to processes of reconstruction and the confidence generated 
by an emergent belief in Keynesian macro policies. 
  A second historically distinctive wave of MS investment by MNEs occurred in 
the  1950s and  1960s,  in  response  to  the  import-substitution  strategies adopted  by 
many poor countries seeking to initiate a manufacturing sector.  Here again MNEs 
had to resort to tariff-jumping investments in order to retain access to established 
profitable markets for their goods, in the face of infant-industry protection.  A second 
significant factor often conditioned this mode of MS behaviour by MNEs, however, in 
the form of a dualistic or highly-inequitable local economy.  Thus the availability of 
significant  demand  for  the  normally  middle-  and  high-income  goods  that  were 
supplied  in  MNEs’  existing  trade  patterns  frequently  required  the  presence  of  a 
peculiarly  prosperous  elite  in  essentially  poor  countries.    A  concomitant  use  of 
capital- and skilled-labour-intensive production processes by MNEs often meant that 
they  not  only  supplied an  urban elite  but  also generated employment and  reward 
patterns  that  served  to  reinforce  it.    Ultimately  the  difficulty  of  sustaining  and 
deepening  this  form  of  industrialisation,  and  the  limited  potential  for  such 
industrial/urban  growth  to  spread  into  wider  forms  of  development,  led  to  the 
abandonment of these import-substitution strategies. 
  A third, more contemporary and differently focused, use of the MS strategy 
has also been observed.  Thus survey evidence (Manea and Pearce, 2004a;  Lankes 
and Venables, 1996; Mutinelli and Piscitello, 1997; Rojec and Svetlicic, 1993) on the   7 
early  operations  of  MNEs  in  the  newly-emerging  Central  and  Eastern  European 
(CEE) transition economies found that, rather than the predicted extensive ES use of 
(presumably cost-effective) inputs, the predominant initial motivation was MS supply 
of  local  markets.    Rather  than  the  traditional  response  to  new  protection  barriers 
denying  access  to  established  markets,  the  MS  in  this  case  has  a  more  market-
development orientation, with local production and marketing seeking a first-mover 
familiarity within these new environments.  In fact there may thus be an implicit  a 
priori acceptance of inefficiency in this approach to the geographical expansion of 
established MNEs, acknowledging that the relatively unformulated economic, market 
and  institutional infrastructure of  these CEE economies would preclude optimised 
decisions regarding immediate supply potentials.  MS entry may here allow MNEs to 
use their most secure OAs (underpinning supply of well-established goods) to learn 
about the real capabilities of CEE LAs, prior to possible movement to more refined 
ES operations or even creative accessing of technological and skilled capacities (KS) 
(Manea and Pearce, 2004a,b). 
  These  contexts  for  use  of  MS  strategy  by  MNEs  are  likely  to  generate 
inefficiency in several ways.  Firstly, the limited markets in which MS behaviour was 
usually  constrained  would  be  likely  to  preclude  full  realisation  of  plant-level 
economies of scale.  Secondly, the fact that patterns of production in MS operations 
were dictated by the structure of demand and protection in the local economy, rather 
than its most effective productive potentials (static comparative advantage), provoked 
the problems of inappropriate technology transfer.  Thus MNEs again suffer from 
non-optimisation of the use of their OAs, whilst host-countries do not secure the most 
efficient activation of their LAs.  Thirdly, the protection against imports and frequent 
limitations in local competition often allowed scope for high levels of X-inefficiency.   8 
  A second strategic context for understanding that MNE expansion often did 
not  mean  achievement  (or  even  pursuit)  of  optimised  efficiency  emerged  from 
pioneering  research  (Knickerbocker,  1973;  Flowers,  1976;  Graham,  1978)  on 
oligopolistic  interaction  in  the  location  decision  process.    Thus  such  research 
indicated that many MNE investment decisions (at least in increasingly concentrated 
globally-competitive industries) were made more as a subjective response to moves 
made by leading rivals than on the basis of an independent objective evaluation of a 
country’s LAs in conjunction with the firms OAs.  Rather than proactively making 
location  decisions  directly  aimed  to  optimise  their  own  efficiency,  growth  and 
profitability, MNEs were often taking defensive options to limit the effect on their 
position of rivals’ moves and/or to precisely constrain the benefits pursued by rivals. 
  Though quite significant elements of MS behaviour may still play important 
roles in the competitive expansion of contemporary MNEs, changes central to the 
evolution of the global economy have moved the focus of their strategic development 
elsewhere.  Two of these changes explicitly remove the key LAs that supported earlier 
MS dominance.  Firstly, the moves towards a free-trade environment, through the 
multilateral negotiations of GATT/WTO rounds and the rise of significant regional-
integration  schemes  (EU;  NAFTA;  MERCOSUR;  ASEAN).    Secondly,  the 
reorientation  of  developing  countries’  industrialisation  strategies  away  from 
protectionist import-substitution towards export-oriented participation in an opening 
global economy.
7  Taken with a rise in the numbers of major internationally-operating 
firms in many industries, the systematic opening of national economies amounts to a 
radical  intensification  of  globalised  competition  for  MNEs.    At  the  level  of  an 
established MS subsidiary this change was manifest in the removal of protection for 
its inefficiencies, through an opening to generalised import competition and, crucially,   9 
a more focused group-level awareness that the particular national market might now 
be  supplied  more cost-effectively  by another subsidiary through  trade.   The  latter 
perception is central to MNEs’ use of freer trade to move towards network supply 
strategies in which individual subsidiaries play the ES role.
8 
  An individual subsidiary in an ES supply programme would specialise in the 
production of a small part of the MNE group’s overall product range and export the 
vast  proportion  of  output  for  distribution  through  the  firm’s  global  marketing 
network.
9    Such  a  subsidiary  repositioning  would  be  expected  to  overcome  the 
inefficiencies endemic to the MS role.  Firstly, group-wide market access would be 
likely to remove possible constraints in the realisation of plant-level economies of 
scale.    Secondly,  the  need  to  sustain  levels  of  productivity  that  are  open  to  the 
informed scrutiny of planners of the group’s internally-competitive supply network 
should remove any significant X-inefficiency.  Thirdly, what goods an ES-subsidiary 
produces can be selected so as to seek to optimise the match between the production 
technology used and the most cost-effective input availabilities of the host country 
(i.e. its strongest sources of static comparative advantage). 
  If achievement of economies of scale and removal of X-inefficiency can be 
considered  to  be  generally  location-neutral  then  we  can  see  the  essence  of  the 
construction of an ES supply network as pursuing the complementarities between an 
MNE’s OAs and a host-country’s input LAs.  If an MNE’s operation in a particular 
location had found the most productive LAs available to it worldwide (i.e. those that 
secure the most cost-effective use of the relevant OAs) and that MNE was making 
available a better package of OAs
10 (i.e. the capabilities to get the greatest value from 
the  country’s  input  potentials)  than  could  any  other  firm  (including  indigenous 
industry), then such an optimised complementarity would achieve the idealised level   10 
of efficiency maximisation postulated earlier.  In more routine terms we can propose 
that competent decision making, as MNEs adopt ES aims in generating global supply 
profiles,  will  bring  about  some  degree  of  efficiency  improvement  in  the  ways 
indicated here. 
  Though  consciously  foregoing  the  use  of  the  international  business 
perspectives  adopted  here  the  macro-level  modelling  of  foreign  direct  investment 
(FDI) by Kojima (1978) provides important normative resonances with our analysis.  
In  his  advocated  scenario  (substantially  paralleling  our  ES  behaviour  by  MNEs) 
Kojima  suggests  that  FDI  should  flow  from  the  least  comparatively  advantaged 
industry  of  an  outward-investing  country  into  a  country  where  the  same  industry 
possesses  a  potential  or  latent  comparative  advantage  (or,  in  an  alternative 
formulation, a ‘comparative advantage in productivity improvement’).  This potential 
would most plausibly take the form of low-cost inputs into the industry’s standardised 
production processes. 
  To  secure  the  activation  of  such  potentials  Kojima  needs  to  see  FDI  as  a 
‘package’ that includes productive resources (our OAs) that are needed to overcome 
the  ‘bottleneck’  in  host-country  capabilities  that  had  left  such  latent  sources  of 
comparative  advantage  underdeveloped.
11    If  we  assume  that  the  adjustment 
mechanism in the home country can secure the redeployment, into hopefully higher-
value growth industries, of the resources released when FDI relocates production out 
of its comparatively disadvantaged sectors, then benefits can be seen in three ways.  
The industrial upgrading just suggested will benefit home-country competitiveness.  
The host-country will see the initiation of competitive export-oriented industry, based 
on the activation of genuine sources of comparative advantage.  Because goods are 
now being supplied from a more efficient location existing home-country customers   11 
will now obtain them as more price-competitive imports, whilst customers in third 
countries who previously may have bought small quantities from the inefficient home 
country may now import greater  quantities  from the new  low-cost supply  source.  
Such a distributed sharing of benefits would manifest the worldwide improvements in 
welfare  of  our  idealised  ‘efficiency’.    In  this  way  Kojima  characterises  this  FDI 
scenario as ‘trade creating’ and welfare enhancing. 
  Kojima  also  provides  a  ‘trade-destroying’  or  welfare-diminishing  FDI 
scenario, which resonates with our market-seeking MNE motivation.  Here FDI flows 
out of one of a home country’s still comparatively advantaged industries into the same 
industry in another developed country.
12  In the host country the industry may or may 
not be amongst the more comparatively advantaged, but is assumed to be (and to 
remain after the inward investment) definitely less efficient than in the source country 
of the FDI.  Therefore the most efficient way to supply host-country demand for these 
goods  would  be  through  export  from  the  home  country,  so  that  the  actual  local 
production through FDI can then be seen to have substituted for trade.  The reasons 
for this efficiency distorting behaviour, Kojima suggests, may be to avoid the costs of 




  If our articulation of the efficiency issue could be seen as purely economic, 
then the logical follow-on is a more political-economic concern with fairness, justice 
or equity in terms of how the performance outcomes of MNEs (whether seemingly 
beneficial  or  problematic)  is  distributed.    The  premise  here  is  that  since  the 
performance of an MNE investment in a particular country reflects both the firm’s 
OAs and the country’s LAs the distribution of the outcome should reflect in some fair   12 
way the respective contribution of these inputs.  The provenance of distribution issues 
in early concerns that FDI
14 might, in some sense, exploit (in particular) developing 
host  countries  has  widened  into  the  suggestion  that  MNEs’  positioning  in 
globalisation can increase inequalities between countries and within countries. 
  The persistence and stridency of debates about equity can be seen to reflect the 
impracticality of attempting to define what would be a fair distribution of the outcome 
from a particular MNE investment project, or even providing a meaningful summary 
of  what  that  distributed  outcome  actually  is  (from  an  overall  perspective).    This 
allows for the intuitive assertion of reasons why the MNE, in particular, may be able 
to  co-opt  ‘unfair’  benefits  from  investments  which  may,  on  other  grounds,  be 
effective  and  desirable.    The  problem  of  categorising  an  accurate/fair  distribution 
derives  from  the  absence  of anything  approaching  a  competitive  market  price for 
many of the inputs to an MNE operation.
15  From the MNE side the intangible and 
highly firm-specific nature of many of their OAs leads to their internalised transfer 
and use, which precludes any form of even negotiated informed pricing of specific 
attributes.  Whilst many host-country inputs (e.g. labour, energy, raw materials) will 
certainly be rewarded in terms of a transparent price, it is not always the case that the 
market in which this was determined operates competitively or is immune to policy-
based manipulation, so that elements of distributional unfairness are again possible.  
When a significant aspect of the viability of an operation reflects host-government 
policies  that  pursue  specific  objectives  (variants  of  import-substitution 
industrialisation) at the expense of permitting rent-seeking MNE behaviour, then any 
idea of fair ‘pricing’ of benefits is again meaningless. 
  Though the ‘stakeholders’ in an MNE operation may be able to hold clearly 
formulated  views  of  aspects  of  its  successes  or  failures  these  would  represent   13 
elements of very differently composed objective functions.  For the MNE a particular 
subsidiary  would  be  expected  to  make  distinctive  contributions  to  the  current 
profitability  and/or  longer-term  competitive  development  of  its  overall  global 
operations.  It is central to our analysis that this contribution can take various forms at 
a point in time, and also be open to change over time (so that processes of evolution 
can be accepted as a reason for temporarily compromised performance).  For a host 
country  the  varied  expectations  from  MNE  participation  may  include  improved 
supply  to  local  customers  (quality  and/or  price  of  goods  and  services),  improved 
conditions  for  local  inputs  (degree  of  usage  and  levels  of  rewards),  improved 
achievement of short-run government policies (e.g. taxation, industrialisation, trade 
balance) and  provision of significant impetus to longer-run objectives in terms of 
sustainable growth and development.  Under these (essentially bounded-rationality) 
circumstances a particular investment may be deemed satisfactory by both ‘partners’ 
and allowed to  progress  in an orderly fashion  (i.e.  without  unanticipated  strategic 
repositioning  by  the  MNE  or  additional  performance  requirements  from  the  host 
government).  This does not imply the presence of any form of aggregated measure of 
the overall level of achievement of the operation or, therefore, of any possible way of 
specifying  what  was  the  actual  division  of  the  outcome  between  MNE  and  host-
country interests. 
  Thus  the  comparison  of  actual  distribution  outcomes  with  idealised  fair 
outcomes presents a doubly infeasible calculation, precluding empirical verification of 
suggested  injustices  driving  aspects  of  globalised  inequality.    Nevertheless,  the 
arguments  demonstrating  the  implausibility  of  resolving  distribution  issues  in 
practical  terms  also  provide  equally  precise  reasons  for  a  persisting  concern,  by 
underlining the presence in determining the basis for a successful operation (i.e. one   14 
satisfying  the  needs  of  interested  parties  enough  to  survive)  of  various  market 
imperfections and policy distortions.  These factors also indicate that in many cases 
distribution  is,  in  practice,  strongly  influenced  by  explicit  or  implicit  bargaining 
processes  between  MNEs  and  host  locations  (countries,  regions  or,  increasingly, 
creative ‘clusters’) in which the parties seek to leverage the unique characteristics and 
capacities of their inputs (i.e. in effect claim monopoly prices for their OAs or LAs 
respectively).  Once again we can suggest that a crucial factor determining the content 
and  concerns  of  such  bargaining  situations  is  the  strategic  positioning  of  the 
operation, in terms of perceived contributions to wider objectives of both the MNE 
and host country. 
  The  focus  of  much  of  the  practical  intuitive  assertion  of  inequities  in 
globalisation is, in effect, ES behaviour by MNEs.  In its most contentious form we 
see ES strategy as MNEs using undifferentiated cost-effective host-country inputs to 
enhance  the  international  efficiency  of  supply  of  highly  price-competitive  goods 
embodying  standardised  technology  and  low-skill  production  processes.    The 
potential for distributional concerns here reflect a case of asymmetrical information, 
in the sense that MNEs may be able to project superior knowledge of key factors in a 
bargaining process.  In terms of LAs, once a host-country is not able to convincingly 
assert any strongly distinctive qualitative characteristics to its inputs, an MNE may 
then  be  in  a  position  to  claim  a  more  informed  comparative  knowledge  of  rival 
economies and thereby suggest a potential for competitive location (or relocation) of 
investments elsewhere.  Such an invocation of the ‘footloose’ option represents the 
bargaining strength accruing to MNEs from operating a global-network strategy, both 
in terms of a manifest flexibility and an ability to plausibly assert possession of better   15 
information on comparative productivity than would be  available to an  individual 
host-country government. 
  Though the OAs used in much ES behaviour are in fact likely to be routine 
and not significantly differentiated qualitatively between competing firms, the ability 
to assert otherwise may still be projected by MNEs.  This, of course, reflects the 
familiar  market-failure  argument  for  intangible  or  knowledge-based  competitive 
attributes, in that MNEs will not reveal the detail of the technology or commercial 
information central to their bargaining position.  Something that may, indeed, differ 
between potential investors and that can therefore be ‘spun’ strongly in bargaining 
processes is the market to which export-oriented ES supply may have access, both in 
terms  of  current  size  and  growth  possibilities.    If  such  elements  of  asymmetrical 
information are convincingly projected by MNEs they can assert both that their OAs 
can better develop competitive potentials of a host economy than could those of rival 
firms,  and  that  other  locations  are  available  to  them  with  equal  or  better  supply 
potentials (LAs).  This, it could be suggested, would then lead a host location to 
concede  unnecessarily  beneficial  terms  to  an  MNE,  imparting  a  bias  to  the 
distribution process. 
  A  generalised  capacity  of  MNEs  to  exercise  bargaining  advantages  in  ES 
situations would lead to excessively generous incentive packages (fiscal benefits in 
terms of tax breaks and subsidies) and downward pressure on input prices;  with a 
notable emphasis on low wage-rates and perhaps repressive employment regulations 
and conditions.  One distributional outcome of this would be worsened international 
inequality,  in  that  enhanced  benefits  would  normally  accrue  to  interests  in  more 
developed  countries  (shareholders  and  home-country  governments  benefiting  from 
MNEs’  profitability  gains,  and  consumers  from  lower  prices)  at  the  expense  of   16 
reduced benefits in developing host countries.  Furthermore, where MNEs benefit 
from  ES  relocation  of  labour-intensive  supply  this  normally  places  downward 
pressure  on  employment  levels  and  conditions  in  the  home  country  and  other 
countries in the supply network.  Unless governments activate effective adjustment 
mechanisms in these countries (as required in the positive efficiency scenario) the 
overall outcome would be a deterioration in global income distribution in terms of a 
worsened situation for low-skilled labour to the benefit of capital, skilled labour and 
higher-income consumers. 
  In the light of our association of the traditional (import-substitution) contexts 
for MS with pervasive inefficiency, we may here be dealing with distribution of losses 
as  much  as  gains,  though  these  would  normally  be  interpreted  as  the  costs  of 
protectionism rather than wilfully perverse MNE decision making.  From the MNE 
point of view it might still logically impute profitability gains to a particular MS 
investment, where these represent the difference between profits now earned through 
local production and those that could have been earned through continued external 
supply  under  the  implemented  levels  of  protection.    It  might  also  feel  a  clear 
awareness of losses, however, by comparing the counterfactual (often ‘once factual’) 
profitability of supply under free (or freer) trade with the lower profitability of the 
current MS production. 
  An MS involvement can also be interpreted as providing forms of second best 
benefits to a protected economy.  In the case of rising generalised protectionism in 
developed economies (a counter-globalisation scenario) MNEs’ MS investments may 
provide offsets to declining employment levels (due to declines in export sectors), 
though the protected jobs created are likely to be inefficient and insecure.  In import-
substitution  industrialisation  strategies  MS  investments create jobs  that  would  not   17 
otherwise have emerged but, as noted in the previous section, these would be closely 
associated with an inequitable internal income distribution and usually be too small in 
number to be part of a sustainable and balanced development process.  Where an MS 
operation is implemented successfully this implies welfare gains for local consumers 
compared to the alternative of importing under protection.  They may also be aware, 
however,  of  welfare  declines  compared  to  importing  under  a  freer  trade  regime.  
Profitability in a MS subsidiary should generate tax revenue for the local government, 
though this will be offset by some loss in the tariff revenue from any imports that 
would have continued without the local production.  Where a government is actively 
pursuing  MS  investments  tax  rates  may  be  subject  to  bargaining,  probably  in 
conjunction with levels of effective protection (covering tariff levels for both the final 
good and any imported intermediates). 
  Though less clearly established as a matter of public concern our perception of 
globalised knowledge seeking (KS) behaviour in MNEs can certainly also provoke 
distribution issues (Pearce, 2002; Pavitt and Patel, 1999; Narula, 2003).  Thus we 
suggest that where a KS operation in a particular location achieves success (in terms 
of securing original scientific results from  a precompetitive  basic/applied research 
project or the competitive finalisation of a significant new product innovation) this is 
likely to reflect its position in two technological and creative communities;  that of the 
host country (its national system of innovation – NSI) and that of the MNE group.  
The selection of a particular location for a pure-science research operation will reflect 
its established reputation and capacity in an area of investigations of strong interest to 
the MNE (i.e. one with a potential  to provide new technology capable of driving 
innovation  in  the  firm’s  industry).  Similarly  a  product  mandate  subsidiary  with 
innovation responsibilities will emerge where the MNE accepts such an operation’s   18 
capacity  to  leverage  distinctive  local  creative  capacities  (scientists,  technologies, 
market research insights, perceptive engineers, dynamic entrepreneurial management) 
to complete and operationalise the development of new goods.  However, a presumed 
ability to use these attributes of an NSI more effectively than could local industry (an 
aspect  of  efficiency  in  innovation)  will  depend  on  application  of  complementary 
inputs from the MNE.  In the case of basic/applied research the MNE is likely to 
provide additional funding and, perhaps more significantly, new scientific questions 
and complementary scientific knowledge that enrich the perspectives and potentials of 
this element of the host-country NSI.  The localised product mandate innovation may 
also be supported by supplementary inputs of technology, engineering expertise and 
market-research insights from elsewhere in the MNE group. 
  On  the  one  hand  this  suggests  that  MNEs’  globalised  approaches  to 
knowledge-based competitive progress can certainly enrich a host-country’s NSI, both 
in terms of its scientific capacity and its ability to successfully operationalise creative 
potentials.  But particular KS successes are normally seen in terms of their networked 
positions by MNEs, and sequential benefits may therefore accrue elsewhere in the 
group’s  operation  (rather  than  moving  ‘horizontally’  within  the  originating  NSI).  
Thus exciting new scientific results from a particular basic R&D lab are most likely to 
move  forward  towards  commercial  potentials  when  possible  synergies  with  other 
results and technologies in other locations can be realised.  Therefore such results may 
flow out of the country in a raw-science state, and have no further local effects.  So 
such successes may well secure further research projects for the MNE laboratory, but 
will not have benefited the immediate competitiveness of the host country.  Similarly 
sustained appropriation of the rewards of successful new product development in a 
mandate subsidiary is not guaranteed.  Though the innovating subsidiary is likely to   19 
initiate production of its new product (and thereby secure early high-value export 
trade), the international success of the good may soon lead to the sharing of supply 
responsibilities with other parts of the group network (for ES or MS reasons).  Again 
limiting the benefits the host country receives from its contribution to the competitive 
enhancement of the MNE. 
 
Sovereignty. 
  Here  we  briefly  review  selected  aspects  of  the  more  politically-oriented 
concerns with the ways that economic globalisation might undermine the sovereign 
powers  of  nation-state  governments.    This  could  involve  both  constraints  on  the 
ability to secure the intended results from implemented policy (e.g. monetary and 
fiscal) and restraints on governments in terms of even the meaningful formulation of 
policies  to  pursue  desired  aims  in  certain  areas  (welfare  and  social  policies).    In 
general terms the theme of such sovereignty concerns is that the vast opening up of 
global markets for, especially, capital, technology, skilled labour, intermediate goods 
and  final  products  and  services,  places  many  governments  in  a  situation  of 
international  policy  competition.    MNEs  can  then  be  seen  as  very  distinctive 
contributors to such sovereignty concerns, partly because they are major players in 
many of these markets and partly because they often, in practice, avoid such arms- 
length transactions with internalised transfers between different parts of their global 
networks.  Though generalised concerns about such aspects of MNEs’ behaviour are 
longstanding they become much more strident and precise with the growth of ES 
networks.  This reflects both the inherent higher levels of intra-group transfers within 
such  integrated  supply  programmes  and  the  ability  to  leverage  the  internally-  20 
competitive flexibility of their networks in negotiating with host-country governments 
(with, therefore, concomitant distribution implications). 
  The  classic  illustration  of  MNEs’  scope  to  use  intra-group  transactions  to 
undermine  the  effectiveness  of  a  particular  host-country  policy  is,  of  course,  the 
transfer pricing of intermediates.  Here the prices charged for transactions between 
parts of an MNE group
16 can be set at levels to influence the extent of reported profits 
in a particular location, so as to minimise the payment of corporation tax in high-tax 
locations and, thereby, maximise global post-tax profitability.  A country that persists 
with  high  tax  rates  may  then  get  limited  revenue  from  any  international  firms 
(domestic as well as foreign) within its economy.  Alternatively a country with high 
levels of MNE participation may have to abandon any intention of implementing tax 
rates that are out of line with those acceptable to those firms as being in line with 
global norms.  Fiscal policy thus becomes constrained by the international positioning 
of a country’s industry. 
  Governments may also find that attempts to attract inward investment in order 
to  generate  improved  employment  opportunities  for  their  labour  supply  may  then 
constrain their ability to influence the quality of jobs and to implement other aspects 
of welfare policies.  Here again MNEs are able to play on the footloose potentials of a 
range of potential locations for their more standardised production processes, where 
the discriminating factor derives from costs rather than any distinctive qualities in 
inputs.  Then minimum wage legislation, setting of particular standards for workers 
welfare,  permission  of  active  unionisation,  and  general  attempts  to  determine 
employment conditions above levels that appear to be available elsewhere, can be 
presented by MNEs as seriously compromising the ‘natural’ value of host-country 
labour.  At an extreme, it is sometime suggested, MNEs may even project suspicion   21 
of the competitive implications of social democratic publically-financed welfare and 
social programmes as indicative of a climate unsympathetic to business interests.  In 
the same way any attempts to increase levels of business regulation in general may 
lead to threats of relocation by MNEs.
17 
 
Growth and Development 
  If our  generic issue  of efficiency was concerned with  the  purely  economic 
matter of how effectively a fixed stock of productive capacities (OAs of MNEs and 
LAs of host  countries) was utilised  at  a point in time, we can now complete  the 
evaluation  framework  with  the  complementary  issue  of  how  expansion  of  such 
capacities  can  support  growth  and  development.    This  then  broadly  relates  to  the 
capacity of MNEs’ globalised pursuit of knowledge seeking (essentially the aim of 
regenerating  their  OAs)  to  play  a  role  in  the  creation  of  dynamic  sources  of 
comparative advantage in host locations.  Central to investigation of such possibilities 
is acknowledgement that, from the point of view of MNEs, growth and development 
means changes in  LAs.  Thus  development can be  seen to manifest  (but also, of 
course, to pursue) changes in host-country market size and characteristics, changes in 
input prices and productive capacities, changes in infrastructure and policy stances, 
and  the  increasing  emergence  and  importance  of  a  distinctive  science  base  and 
research capacity. 
  Our  analysis  of  MNEs’  strategic  motivations  can  indicate  four  possible 
responses  to  changing  location  characteristics  of  economies  in  the  processes  of 
development (Pearce, 2001).  Firstly, footloose closure of existing ES subsidiaries as 
increasing wage rates and other input prices undercut their cost-effective position in 
the MNE supply network.  Secondly, the upgrading of a subsidiary’s position in a   22 
supply  network,  by  co-opting  the  higher  productive  potentials  of,  in  particular, 
increasingly  skilled  (albeit  also  higher-cost)  labour  into  production  of  more 
technologically-sophisticated  higher-value-added  elements  of  the  MNE’s  existing 
product range.  Here the MNE transfers the use of more technically-advanced and 
quality-competitive  OAs  into  a  particular  subsidiary/country,  replacing  the  more 
standardised ones originally used there (which are then, indeed, reapplied – in the 
footloose  manner  –  in other  countries,  which, in  effect,  can  replicate the  original 
LAs). 
  Thirdly, MNEs may use their operations in a particular country to address the 
more forward-looking strategic aim of extending their competitive scope by drawing 
local  creative  resources  (also,  obviously,  part  of  a  country’s  key  developmental 
potentials) into the innovation of new products.  Here product mandate operations 
now seek to generate and activate new OAs for their group in a KS manner, rather 
than apply existing OAs in pursuit of MS or ES aims.  Fourthly, as countries generate 
increasingly strong and distinctive science bases and research capabilities, as part of 
their  pursuit  of  sustainable  longer-term  growth,  these  too  may  become  attributes 
(more intangible forms of LA) attractive to the KS strategies of MNEs.  Thus the 
fully-developed pursuit of strategic competitiveness (Pearce 1999b) in MNEs would 
recognise the need to quite systematically investigate those sources of precompetitive 
scientific progress (basic research) that have the potential to fuel the more radical 
long-term  evolution  of  their  industry’s  core  technologies,  and  also  perceive  that 
increasingly these sources can be dispersed in a number of separate environments 
(specific creative ‘clusters’ as well as more traditional NSIs).  The relation of these 
last two strategic responses in MNEs to growth and development will be elaborated   23 
below.    First,  however,  we  review  how  they  might  emerge  from  the  traditional 
(MS/ES) strategic positions in MNE subsidiaries.
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  It  is  in  the  nature  of  effective  MS  subsidiaries  to  build  up  knowledge  of 
aspects  of  their  local  economy,  in  the  process  of  adapting  existing  products  and 
processes so as to maximise the profitability they can generate from their MNE’s 
established sources of competitiveness.  Sustained embeddedness in a country where 
development  eventually  begins  to  significantly  individualise  local  tastes,  skills, 
technologies and scientific capabilities would be quite likely to lead ambitious MS 
subsidiaries to seek to internalise the elements of locally distinctive creative scopes 
towards the aim of accession to product mandate innovation.  It is likely that, in 
practice, little of this mode of localised product development  occurred during  the 
earlier phases of MS operations.  Thus the need to refocus import-substitution MS 
subsidiaries may have mainly occurred before very many host countries were strongly 
demonstrating such creative/knowledge potentials, and also before the restructured 
MNE  supply  networks  became  systematically  amenable  to  the  incorporation  of 
KS/product mandate operations. 
  More  realistic  possibilities  may  be  implied,  however,  within  the  more 
contemporary,  innately  exploratory,  MS  operations  through  which  MNEs  seem  to 
build  their  bridgeheads  in  emerging  European  transition  economies  (Manea  and 
Pearce, 2004a).  Here, it is indicated, these subsidiaries have a tendency, quite early in 
their operations, to seek to individualise their competitiveness in CEE markets by 
generating  distinctive  additions  to  their  MNE  group’s  established  product  range, 
through  the  substantial  competitive  development  of  existing  local  goods  and  the 
adoption  of  local  technologies.    The  more  original  and  competitive  of  these  new 
goods  may  then  be  found  to  have  considerable  potential  for  export  to  the  parent   24 
MNE’s more important existing markets (notably W.Europe).  It may, in fact, be the 
case that, whereas attempts to build-up new cost-efficient export-supply (ES) facilities 
in CEE economies may have been constrained inter alia by the political skills and 
influence of those existing W. European units that they might usurp, the export of 
newly-derived goods would be easier because they do not seem so clearly competitive 
with  existing  interests  in  the  established  network.    Ultimately  CEE  operations  of 
MNEs may enter wider group supply-networks on the basis of KS creativity rather 
than ES cost-efficiency.  This would then also be likely to provide a more valuable 
and more sustainable contribution to the development and growth of these transition 
economies. 
  As  already  observed  the  purely  resource-allocative  interpretation  of  ES 
operations precludes any form of endogenous dynamism.  A very specific set of host-
country LAs are activated in a highly competitive manner by a very specific package 
of MNE OAs.  This projects an entirely group-positioned role, with no scope for 
subsidiary-level individualism or ambition and, therefore, no allowance for forward-
looking  creation-oriented  expenditures  (R&D;  market  research).    In  fact  the 
heterarchical (Hedlund, 1986, 1993) MNE will view its network as inherently flexible 
and as seeking dynamic sources of competitive evolution as much as static efficiency.  
Thus rising input prices may not be automatically interpreted as a reason for closure, 
in a one-dimensional decision process, but rather as a signal for a re-evaluation of the 
particular location and the competitive positioning of  the subsidiary in it (Pearce, 
2001;  Birkinshaw  and  Hood,  1998;  Birkinshaw,  Hood  and  Jonsson,  1998).    This 
would, in turn, allow increasingly ambitious and confident local managers to assert  
the developmental possibilities that they can derive from their economy’s widening 
qualitative potentials. As noted above this would initially involve the employment of   25 
increasingly  distinctive  and  productive  local  inputs  in  the  supply  of  more 
sophisticated and technologically-advanced parts of a group’s product range.  In some 
cases  this  systematic  process  of  subsidiary  evolution,  involving  an  increasingly 
committed interpretation and cooption of the expanding host-country capacities, can 
eventually reach the point of using local creative capacities to develop new parts of 
the MNE’s product range.  This process of creative transition (Papanastassiou and 
Pearce,  1994,  1999)  embeds  the  subsidiary  more  profoundly  in  a  country’s 
development,  by  basing  its  supply  operations  around,  in  effect,  unique  locally-
generated OAs,  rather than persisting dependence on those from  elsewhere in  the 
group. 
  Interestingly Kojima’s (1978) modelling of trade-creating FDI prefigures the 
suggestion that (in our terms) ES investments can be compatible with subsequent 
orderly and sustainable development.  Thus the industries that are first ‘priced-out’ of 
a developed industrial economy, he suggests, are those with the most basic techniques 
and,  therefore,  those  most  easily  assimilated  in  the  potentially  comparatively 
advantaged sector of a developing country.  In playing this ‘tutor’ role the initial FDI 
inculcates a basic level of new skills and industrial practices and procedures which, 
when fully familiar and routinely operational, can provide the foundations for a new 
wave of progressive transfer and learning through upgraded FDI in the next industry 
up the technology ‘ladder’.  Kojima does not, however, model a ‘tipping point’ where 
technology transfer is replaced by localised technology generation. 
  Product  mandate  (PM)  subsidiaries  can  be  considered  to  make  a  positive 
contribution to development when they secure better performance from those local 
creative attributes that they access than indigenous enterprise would otherwise have 
been capable of doing.  Thus a PM subsidiary emerges within an MNE group in   26 
reflection of its ability to internalise distinctive host-country competences; in human 
capital  (talented  scientists,  creative  engineers,  innovative  marketing  personnel, 
entrepreneurial and ambitious managers) alongside favoured access to existing stocks 
of indigenous technology (either already embodied in established products or awaiting 
commercial development) and unique elements of research capacity in the science 
base (e.g. areas of world class specialisation in local universities).  Policy support by 
governments for the generation of such attributes within a development programme 
will target specific aspects of broadly perceived growth.  These may summarise as 
sustainable full employment across an appropriate range of skills, so as to support an 
internationally-competitive economy that is increasingly driven by logically-evolving 
sources  of  dynamic  or  created  comparative  advantage.    An  MNE’s  strategic 
expectations from a PM subsidiary (normally the creation and supply of competitive 
new  goods  to  international  markets)  are  clearly  consistant  with  a  host-country’s 
normal developmental expectations.  The precise forms of host-country benefits that 
emerge, and the ability of PM operations to generate them, can then be seen to remain 
strongly influenced by the subsidiary’s intra-group positioning. 
  One aspect of this is that the developmental aims of a PM (or, importantly, of 
an advanced ES subsidiary that is seeking the move to a systematic creative KS role) 
will be formulated in the light of its familiarity with the established core competitive 
capabilities  and  aims  of  the  group  (existing  OAs).    This  may  give  it  a  superior 
capacity, compared to local enterprise, to detect and evaluate emerging innovation-
supporting potentials (knowledge-related LAs).  Nevertheless PM subsidiaries will 
often need to secure their access to these creative inputs in competition with local 
firms.  Their ability to do this may reflect their ability to offer higher rewards, along 
with a more stimulating creative environment.  Once again this will reflect the PM’s   27 
ability  to  leverage  its  access  to  group-level  OAs.  Here  the  core  established 
technologies and skills of the group are still likely to be relevant, often providing the 
subsidiary with a secure and familiar platform from which to assimilate the distinctive 
local inputs and build the idiosyncratic contributions of its own innovation process.  
Similarly,  even  where  a  PM  takes  responsibility  for  key  aspects  of  how  its  own 
products  are  marketed  internationally,  it  is  likely  to  receive  considerable  benefits 
(compared  with  an  alternative  indigenous  product  innovator)  from  access  to  an 
MNE’s global distribution network and established trademarks and reputation. 
  PMs can be seen as an embedded element of development since they extend a 
country’s competitiveness through the operationalisation of new skill and knowledge 
scopes generated by investments in education and training and scientific research and 
technology programmes.  The most direct manifestation of this may be higher levels 
of higher-wage employment, improved foreign-exchange earnings and higher growth 
rates,  which  can  then  generate  (at  the  macro  level)  capacity  for  further  public 
investment in resource improvement.  Within the purview of evolutionary economics 
a successful PM generates its own sources of developmental momentum.  Thus those 
sources of local creative competence (personnel employed, research collaborations, 
etc.)  that  are  co-opted  because  of  their  current  expertise  will  exercise  this  in 
conjunction with MNE technology and insights and, in the processes of contributing 
to immediate (product development) success, also increase their own tacit knowledge.  
This may not only be a source of evolutionary impulsion within the PM (bases for 
further innovations) but also a new and distinctive (because partly conditioned by 
MNE inputs) element in the country’s creative scopes.  It can also be observed that 
the more successful a PM is in its developmental objective, the less need there is to be 
concerned with the potential distributional problem (noted in the relevant section) that   28 
the MNE might quite quickly relocate production of a new good to an alternative 
lower cost site.  Thus where the internal creative competences of a PM can sustain a 
strong  developmental  impetus,  reflecting  growing  capacities  of  the  host  NSI,  the 
freedom to focus on the higher-value-added innovation stages of the product life cycle 
and shed the more routine supply of maturing goods would be welcomed. 
  The other form of KS to be evaluated briefly here is the increased propensity 
of  MNEs  to  carry  out  (through  ‘stand  alone’  labs  or  collaborations  with  local 
universities)  precompetitive  (basic  and/or  applied)  research  in  internationalised 
networks.  The emergence of this reflects, firstly, an acknowledgement, by both firms 
and  countries,  that  new  scientific  knowledge  is  likely  to  fuel  the  longer-term 
processes of development in the form of the capacity to create radically new goods 
and  services.    Secondly,  the  decentralisation  of  such  research  reflects  MNEs’ 
realisation that different parts of a programme of investigation covering a range of 
different scientific disciplines can be beneficially spread across a number of different 
country’s science bases.  This reflects a globalised technological heterogeneity, in 
which  particular  countries  have  established  positions  of  research  leadership  in 
particular areas of investigation. 
  The decision by  an MNE to locate a particular  facet of  its precompetitive 
research agenda in a particular country is likely to further strengthen the relevant 
areas of that country’s scientific capacities.  One aspect  of this is that the MNE’s 
commitment of additional funding may permit, otherwise unavailable, expansion of 
work  in  these  areas  of  specialisation.    Perhaps  most  significantly,  the  MNE 
participation  may  enrich  this  expansion  by  providing  it  with  new  challenges  and 
perspectives.  Thus the MNE will locate a project in a country where the science base 
is highly qualified to carry it out, but with the aims of the research defined within the   29 
firm’s  much  wider  technology  interests.    Thus  local  scientists  will  exercise  their 
defining capabilities (reflecting the technological heritage of their NSI) to address a 
rather  different  research  agenda  than  would  have  been  otherwise  generated  and 
probably in conjunction with new technology perspectives (those of the MNE).  This 
may  usefully  offset  an  increasing  agglomerative  narrowing  of  the  scientific 
specialisation of the NSI, by adding new research dimensions that use its existing 
areas of leadership but widen them in logical and coherent directions (that would not 
have been provoked by local needs). 
  If MNE involvement may strengthen the facet of a country’s NSI that pursues 
pure-scientific investigation through basic and applied research, it would not seem to 
have  any  potential  to  improve  the,  inherently  rather  inchoate  and  ill-defined, 
mechanisms  through  which  new  scientific  results  are  perceived  to  provide  real 
possibilities  in  commercial  development.    Two,  interlinked,  factors  may  in  fact 
diminish the potential for the achievements of MNE’s basic research in a country to 
flow towards localised innovation.  Firstly, in a way that might be more elusive for 
R&D units in a purely national firm, MNEs’ basic research laboratories are often able 
to  secure  physical  and  organisational  independence  from  their  company’s  other 
operations in the country.  Whilst this allows them to avoid undesirable distractions, 
in  the  form  of  ‘firefighting’  short-term  technical  problems  in  production  and 
marketing, it also limits the possibilities of providing direct technological inputs into 
the  generation  of  developmental  aims  in  the  MNE’s  local  supply  subsidiaries.  
Secondly,  complementing  the  previous  point,  the  more  or  less  predetermined 
destination for the results of successful pure research in these stand-alone units is out 
of the country, for some form of synthesis or co-development with the work of other 
similar MNE-group labs.  Thus the corollary of the strengthening of basic research,   30 
through access to new resources, challenges and technologies, is that this networked 




MNE strategy, trade policy and new growth theory. 
  One area of debate, developed within mainstream economics, that has strong 
synergies with lines of argument generated here, is that relating host country trade-
policy  regimes  to  differential  implications  of  FDI  for  growth  performance.    The 
pioneering  exposition  of  Bhagwati  (1978;  1985;  cited  in  Balasubramanyam  et  al, 
1996) combines two assertions.  Firstly, that export promotion (EP) trade strategies 
will attract more FDI than import substitution (IS) strategies.  Secondly, that FDI 
made under EP regimes has more favourable effects on growth than that made under 
IS policies. 
  The Bhagwati indictment of an IS environment for FDI encompasses many of 
the distortions and inefficiencies that have been here associated with the MS mode of 
MNE strategy;  deriving primarily from tariffs and quotas on trade as the principal 
policy instruments.  Summarised by Balasubramanyam et al (1996, pp. 93-4) this 
includes  “widespread  distortions  in  factor and  product  markets” and  “adoption  of 
techniques  of  production  widely  at  variance  with  the  factor  endowment  of  the 
economy”.  Also, along with such promotion “of misallocation of resources [IS] also 
encourages  X-inefficiency”.    Furthermore  IS  “contributes  to  growth  of  income 
disparities”  and  “provides  widespread  incentives  for  rent  seeking  and  directly 
unproductive profit seeking activities”.  By contrast Bhagwati’s characterisation of EP 
as emerging from a trade neutral or bias free policy framework, “allows for a free play 
of  market  forces  and  the  allocation  of  resources  on  the  basis  of  comparative   31 
advantage”  (Balasubramanyam  et  al,  1996,  p.  94)  that  could  be  compatible  with 
MNEs’ ES strategies. 
  In an empirical investigation Balasubramanyam and Salisu (1991) validated 
Bhagwati’s expectation that EP countries would attract greater quantities of FDI than 
IS countries.  Subsequently, Balasubramanyam, Salisu and Sapsford (1996) addressed 
Bhagwati’s qualitative assertions.  Here the effect of FDI on growth in a sample of EP 
countries was significantly stronger than for a sample of IS countries;  with, in fact, 
FDI  not  being  significantly  related  to  growth  for  the  latter  group  of  countries.  
Furthermore,  in  the  tests  for  the  EP-country  sample  FDI  proved  the  strongest 
determinant  of  growth,  “followed  by  additions  to  the  labour  force,  followed  by 
increased exports”, with  increase in the stock of  domestic capital  least influential 
(Balasubramanyam, et al 1996, p. 102).  The authors interpret these results in terms of 
the tenets of new growth theory.  This argument (Balasubramanyam et al, 1996, pp. 
94-6) embodies two strands.  Firstly, that FDI in principal has the capacity to add to a 
country’s  endowment  of  those  characteristics  (human  capital  accumulation  and 
learning by doing;  R&D and technology generation;  scale economies;  knowledge 
spillovers)  whose  endogenisation  in  growth  allows  the  social  rate  of  return  on 
investments to exceed the private rate.  Secondly, that this potential is more likely to 
be realised when FDI is part of a country’s EP industrialisation strategy than an IS 
regime.
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  Our  interpretation  of  MNEs’  strategic  options is  fully  compatible  with  the 
explanation offered above, and can offer a supportive refinement to the second strand 
of  Balasubramanyam  et  al’s  exposition.    As  suggested  earlier,  the  sources  of 
profitability for MS subsidiaries in a host-country’s IS policy environment involve no 
guarantee (indeed limited likelihood) of the transfer of appropriate technologies or   32 
human capital capabilities;  in the sense of being those that can become endogenised 
in  host-country  growth  that  is  realising  the  true  potentials  of  local  comparative 
advantage.
21    By contrast both ES and KS (PM innovation and R&D) strategies fit 
into EP policy frames, and do so, we suggest, in potentially sequentially-embedded 
(or  endogenously-evolutionary)  ways.    Thus  ES,  we  have  indicated,  transfers 
appropriate technologies that secure economies of scale and productive efficiency and 
inculcate (through training) the most relevant improvements in local human capital to 
support activation of growth around current sources of static comparative advantage.  
Then KS and product development activities of MNEs can supersede ES technology 
transfer  by  (within  a  properly  formulated  host-country  development  programme) 
generating  new  technology  and  sources  of  dynamic  comparative  advantage,  that 
embed these subsidiaries’ operations within the core attributes of the growth process. 
 
Conclusions. 
  This paper seeks to investigate the use by MNEs of two separable aspects of 
the globalising economy of recent years.  Firstly, the institutions of globalisation that 
have increased the freedoms of international transfer and motivated the opening of 
national  economies.    Secondly,  the  processes  of  globalisation  that  have  often 
enhanced the rate of change of the characteristics of national economies in ways that 
increasingly respond to external challenges and potentials.  The differential strategic 
imperatives of heterarchical MNEs are seen as inherently interactive with the dynamic 
diversity inculcated within economic globalisation.  The analysis has indicated two 
positive potentials that can derive from the globalised context for the MNE/national 
economy interface.  Firstly, the efficiency seeking motivation can support countries’ 
moves towards outward-oriented industrialisation based on activation of sources static   33 
comparative advantage.  This can not only provide an initiating impulse to national 
economic  growth  but  improve  global  resource-allocative  efficiency.    Secondly, 
MNEs’ expanding knowledge seeking motivation can both enhance the competitive 
application  of  a  country’s  creative  attributes  (notably  in  localised  product 
development)  and  also  become  embedded  in  the  further  enrichment  of  these 
technology- and skill-related sources of sustainable growth. 
  Since  the  suggested  positive  efficiency  and  development  potentials  are 
predicated on MNEs’ beneficial leveraging of various differences between national 
economies  (or  sub-regions  thereof)  it  is  logical  to  also  emphasise  the  continued 
responsibilities of national governments’ policies within the globalisation scenarios.  
One aspect of this is to ensure that the national economy is perceived as one whose 
existing  sources  of  competitiveness  are  freely  available  for  international  strategic 
operationalisation.  Part of this would be a neutral trade policy stance in the sense of 
one that does not discriminate against export-oriented activity per se, and then allows 
this to emerge around the country’s genuine sources of comparative advantage (i.e. 
eschewing any form of distorting export subsidisation).  Complementing this, internal 
factor and other markets should also be permitted to allow resources to move into 
those  sectors  that  manifest  international  competitive  efficiency.    Then,  from  the 
development  point  of  view,  government  policies  need  to  accept  the  (desirable) 
transitory nature of a particular source of competitiveness (e.g. low-cost labour) and 
invest in the upgrading of human- and knowledge-capital through education, training 
and scientific research. 
  But these positive potentials are also predicated on MNEs’ move to global 
strategies (predominantly encompassing ES and/or KS motivations rather than MS) 
that  position  individual  subsidiaries  within  internationalised  programmes  and   34 
networks.    Thus,  for  MNEs,  success  is  defined  in  terms  of  realising  a  desired 
objective in terms of contribution to the group’s overall competitiveness, which may 
reflect very different priorities from those of a host country.  Though MNE operations 
may often provide positive sum outcomes, how this is then distributed may be a cause 
of  considerable  concern.    Central  to  this  is  the  perception  that  unique  firm-level 
competences and globalised competitive postures provide MNEs with considerable 
bargaining strength.
22  This perception has often been manifest in the adoption of 
some variant of ‘inward investment’ policy.  Where countries feel themselves to be in 
a very competitive ‘market’ for the types of FDI they believe will benefit them they 
may seek to boost their attractiveness through the defensive offering of investment 
incentive packages.  Or where countries believe they are capable of providing more 
distinctive attributes to MNEs, they may adopt a more proactive stance,  targeting 
particular benefits through the imposition of various performance requirements.  Both 
of these have clear distribution implications, with incentives surrendering (perhaps 
unnecessarily)  possible  benefits  ex  ante  to  secure  investments  and  performance 
requirements (UNCTAD, 2003) aiming to ensure ex post that MNE operations behave 
in  ways  that  provide  explicit  forms  of  benefits  targeted  by  the  host  country.  
Importantly, however, these measures may also affect the efficiency and development 
outcomes by potentially distorting investment decisions and the content of subsidiary 
operation. 
  The  bargaining  stances  affecting  distribution  may  also  be  seen  to  have 
implications for national sovereignty, in the sense that policy positions are articulated 
specifically in relation to the needs and influence of external economic agents.  The 
origins of this in the global options (and, therefore, flexibility) of MNEs can then be 
generalised  into  the  concern  that  wider,  essentially  non-discriminatory,  areas  of   35 
national policy become constrained by a perceived need to attract MNEs and to secure 




1   These issues have been reviewed and evaluated in MacBean and Balasubramanyam (1978, 
chapter 8), Casson and Pearce (1987) and Dunning (1994). 
2   A specialised institution here is the export processing zone (EPZ) “defined as an enclave outside 
the customs territory of a country” (Balasubramanyam, 1988, p. 157).  Here goods are allowed to 
enter an EPZ for processing, storage and manufacture without payment of customs duties and 
local taxes, and subsequently re-exported without payment of duties.  With access to low-cost 
labour and the support of tax holidays and other fiscal incentives such EPZs can attract the 
efficiency-seeking elements of MNEs’ global strategies.  In some countries, such as India, 
Indonesia and Philippines, the early adoption of EPZs served as a “grudging concession in favour 
of an outward-looking strategy of development” within a policy context that remained 
predominantly protectionist and “centred on import-substituting industrialisation” 
(Balasubramanyam, 1988, p. 158).  Where EPZs represented such a policy compromise, serving 
as “a second-best method of attracting FDI into export industries for countries wedded to 
protecting their import-competing industries”, the results were usually unsatisfactory in terms of 
immediate performance or developmental impetus.  As examples of EPZ success the city states of 
Hong Kong and Singapore are seen by Balasubramanyam (1988, p. 164) to tell a different story 
since “the entire economy in [these cases] could be regarded as a duty-free zone” and thus 
operatively closer to his (1988, p. 161) “first-best method [of] the adoption of a liberal foreign 
trade regime bereft of tariffs and quotas on imports”.  Residual distortions, after the 1991 reforms, 
are found by Balasubramanyam and Mahambare (2003, pp. 65-8) to play a major role in the 
persisting limited success of EPZs in India. 
3   The antecedents of the approach used here are in Behrman (1984) and Dunning (1993). 
4   A fourth logical motivation, not used here, would be characterised as ‘natural-resource (or 
primary product) seeking’. 
5   Product mandates are creative subsidiaries (Pearce, 1999a) which take responsibility for the 
creation as well as supply of parts of an MNE’s product range.  They were originally 
conceptualised (Poynter and Rugman, 1982;  D’Cruz, 1986) from observation of subsidiaries 
operating in Canada.  Their position in contemporary strategies of MNEs have been investigated 
by inter alia Papanastassiou and Pearce (1999), Roth and Morrison (1992), Birkinshaw (1996), 
Feinberg (2000), Tavares and Pearce (2002). 
6   The role of dispersed R&D in the globalising strategies of MNE has been investigated from many 
perspectives (e.g. Hakanson and Nobel, 2000;  Furu, 2000;  Granstrand, 1999;  Pearce, 1999b;  
Papanastassiou and Pearce, 1997a,b;  Kuemmerle, 1999). 
7  An element of potential distortion sometimes remained present when preferred access to 
developed country Generalised System of Preference (GSP) schemes replaced protected access to 
domestic markets as a policy basis for infant-industry support. 
8   In an investigation of Japanese FDI in the EU in the buildup to the 1992 Single European Market 
(SEM) programme Balasubramanyam and Greenaway (1992, pp. 185-6) trace two routes to the 
emergence of export-oriented (i.e. ES) operations using the increased freedom of Union-wide 
trade.  Firstly, “bridgehead investment refers to new investment in a specific location which is 
regarded as a base from which to supply the wider European market.”  To the extent that the 
decision to produce within Europe here includes concern over ‘fortress Europe’ then this 
“fortress-jumping investment” includes a clear residual element of MS behaviour.  But the precise 
location chosen as the bridgehead in the EU is then likely to reflect ES influences.  Secondly, 
completion of the SEM may affect incumbent operations in the EU in the form of rationalisation 
investment, involving “a restructuring of existing operations, for instance closing down some 
facilities and concentrating on others, or building additional plants to service the entire market 
rather than subsets of it.”  Here operations which would have originally responded to MS 
imperatives are now reformulated to meet a new ES context.  Subsidiary positioning and   36 
 
evolution in the context of EU strategy has been investigated for Ireland (Tavares, 2001) and 
Portugal (Tavares and Pearce, 2001). 
9   Variants of this could be performance of one stage in a vertically-integrated production sequence, 
assembly, or supply of particular intermediate goods. 
10   Here appropriate OAs would not only involve the technologies and management capabilities to 
maximise productivity but also the best international market access (provided by the MNE’s 
distribution network) in terms of current size, stability and growth potential. 
11  In effect the industry has lost comparative advantage in the home country of the FDI because the 
standardised inputs to production (LAs) there have become uncompetitive by international 
standards whilst, in our terms, the firms have retained competitive OAs, which can then be 
relocated to new low-cost host countries.  Thus Kojima’s case for this positive scenario was the 
migration of Japanese firms (FDI in his methodology) to low-wage Asian economies when labour 
costs become uncompetitive at home. 
12   The case for this scenario would be US firms’ investment in European economies in the decades 
after the Second World War. 
13   These MS influences are essentially those chosen by Vernon (1966) to explain the initiation of 
overseas production by firms in the latter part of the second stage of his product cycle model.  
Interestingly the behaviour that Vernon predicted for the third (standardised product) stage 
emerged as classic ES pursuit of low-cost production locations. 
14   It was, for example, suggested that imperfections in the markets for the separate elements of the 
FDI package negated the advocated possibility of ‘unpackaging’ FDI and thereby allowed firms 
to earn monopoly rents on their technology, skills, etc. 
15   It is also unlikely that attempts to agree on imputation of ex post shadow prices within a formal 
analytical attempt to resolve distribution debates on particular MNE outcomes would achieve 
consensus. 
16   This can include physical goods in the form of components, intermediates in vertically-integrated 
production processes and final products, and also cover intangibles in terms of royalty rates for 
technology, fees for management services and so on. 
17   There may be an important paradox here.  Thus it may be felt that the benefits of globalisation 
cannot be fully and fairly achieved without adequate adjustment mechanisms (and welfare-
support systems) operated internally by national governments.  But the bargaining postures of 
MNEs (as potentially positive agents in globalisation) may oppose or constrain the ability of 
governments to fund, or perhaps even to advocate, the forms of interventionism involved. 
18   This is not to presume that such KS activities can only emerge out of antecedent MS or ES 
operations.  Production subsidiaries could be set up as product mandates ab initio and, perhaps as 
often as not, basic/applied precompetitive research laboratories may emerge independently of any 
(past or present) supply facilities.  Nevertheless, it is generally plausible that the familiarity with, 
and interpretation of, a location’s KS potentials may be conditioned by the presence and form 
(MS or ES) of well-established operations there. 
19   This leakage does not systematically counter the argument that these MNE labs can generally 
strengthen precompetitive research in the NSI.  Thus important new scientific results take on 
public good characteristics within the MNE and, even when being applied and developed 
elsewhere in the group, also remain part of the enhanced competences of the lab that created 
them.  This may then become a key part of the capacities of the lab that can attract further 
important research projects within the group network.  Similarly host-country scientists who 
participate in successful projects gain significant tacit knowledge in the process, which can have 
strong potentials to spillover into benefits to the wider local science base. 
20   The ways in which the broad trade policy context, and particular details of its implementation, 
affect the extent and form of FDI in India and China are evaluated by Balasubramaniam and 
Mahambre (2003, pp. 55-60). 
21   As Balasubramaniam, Salisu and Sapsford (1996, pp. 96) observe “mere infusion of human 
capital and technology into a distortion ridden economy may neither lift the economy to a higher 
plane nor alter the slope of the production function.  It may, instead, merely serve to redistribute 
income in favour of the new agents of production.” 
22   Once countries apply any form of measure to directly attract, or influence the behaviour of, MNE 
operations it can be considered that some form of bargaining power has imposed itself. 
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